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1) Introduction 
This paper reports the deliberations of a panel of three speakers which met on 
12 June 2014, 12.00-18.00 in Bournemouth University Business School’s 
Executive Business Centre (EBC) as part of BU’s annual Festival of Learning to 
discuss the topic: “Have We Made Banking Good?” 
The event was aimed at a general and audience and organised and Chaired by 
Andy Mullineux (Professor of Financial Economics and Deputy Dean Research in 
the Business School) relating to BU’s “Enterprise and Economic Growth” 
Research Theme (www.bournemouth.ac.uk/fol). 
The panellists were: Kate Elliot (Investment Management Services, Rathbones, 
Liverpool), Ed Mayo (Secretary General, Co-operatives UK) and Richard Werner 
(Professor of International Banking, Business School, University of 
Southampton).  Kate had written a report for the Ecumenical Council for 
Corporate Responsibility (ECCR) which was launched in Birmingham in November 
2011 and entitled: “Restoring Trust in Banks”. Andy had been a panellist 
discussing the report and subsequently joined the West Midlands ECCR 
committee Chaired by the Right Reverend David Urquhart, Bishop of 
Birmingham; which met with representatives of UK banks to consider how trust 
in them might indeed be restored.  The deliberation of the West Midlands ECCR 
informed Kate’s follow-up report entitled: “The Banks and Society: Trust 
Rebuilt?” It was launched at Rathbones in Liverpool in March 2014 and formed 
the basis of her panel presentation. 
Ed Mayo heads the trade association of Co-operatives in the UK, which includes 
credit unions.  It had been an eventful year for the Co-operative movement 
following the findings by the Bank of England in 2013 that the Co-operative 
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Bank Plc was undercapitalised and the consequent need for the Co-operative 
Group to inject capital and bring in a large amount of private capital to shore it 
up.  The contrast with the continuing success of the John Lewis Partnership, the 
employee-owned cooperative in the retail sector, was stark.  Ed and Andy had 
worked together on the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Report entitled: “Small is 
Bankable” in 1998.  That report advocated the development of Community 
Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) as an alternative source of funding 
for smaller enterprises.  More recently Andy and Ed have worked on a Blog for 
Co-operatives UK on the “Future of Mutual Banking in the UK”, which will form 
part of a book entitled: “Co-operative Advantage, to be launched in 2015”. 
Richard Werner had recently launched the Hampshire Community Bank, a mutual 
bank, with the backing of Eastleigh County Council and funding for lending to 
small enterprises from the UK government Department of Business, Information 
and Skills (BIS).  Andy was engaged by Eastleigh County Council to serve as an 
advisor on the project proposal. 
The panellists were clearly well placed to discuss whether or not banks had been 
made good as a result of post crisis regulatory reforms, or at least been made 
better and more trustworthy. 
2. The Panel Discussion 
Speaking first, Kate noted that there was no black or white answer to whether 
trust in banks had been built; the answer was rather a shade of grey!  She had 
started work on the first ECCR Report in 2009, which had focussed on social 
and environmental issues, and started the follow-up report in 2013.  Lots of 
issues covered in the 2011 report remained pertinent in 2013/14, whilst social 
justice issues relating to bank taxation had been added as an important issue.   
The 2014 Report found that trust in banks had not yet been rebuilt, although 
considerable transformation was underway with the aim of rebuilding trust in 
the banking industry and the answer may be to encourage diversity in the 
banking sector. Kate drew a distinction between trust and confidence.  At the 
start of the crisis, in August 2007, banks lost trust in each other; as 
manifested by the collapse of their willingness to lend to other banks through 
the interbank market.  Governments and Central Banks then intervened in an 
attempt to maintain confidence in the stability of banking systems, but trust in 
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individual banks was eroded.  Kate noted that since the crisis banks had 
continued to undermine trust through a series of miss-selling scandals, such as 
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI), and the LIBOR and exchange rate market 
price rigging scandals. 
Despite these backward steps, with the help of the regulatory and structural 
reforms advocated in the Vicker’s (Final) Report in September 2011  and the 
Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards (PCBS) (Final) Report in 
November 2013, as incorporated in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
in December 2014, and subject to amendments in April 2014., some forward 
steps had been taken and some good noises sounded, Kate concluded. 
The 2014 Report was based on meeting with the six major UK banks, including 
Santander.  The banks had sent higher ranking staff to these meetings than 
they had to those informing the 2011 Report and thus seemed to take the 
exercise more seriously.  The West Midlands group fed into the 2014 Report, 
but had felt that the banks representatives that attended their meetings were 
more representative of corporate social responsibility (CSR) than operational 
activities at their banks. Kate’s interviews with the more senior bankers 
revealed that they were seemingly trying to embed better values and improve 
compliance, and the recent Lloyds CSR report had contained forward looking 
statements consistent with this. 
As regards regional lending, the British Banking Association had recently 
published postal-code related lending data, but the reporting was somewhat 
granular and more transparency would be desirable.  More detailed information 
on executive remuneration and appropriate rewards for genuine success, rather 
than failure and ‘talent’ would also help to restore trust, Kate felt. 
As chair, Andy observed that at a Centre for Responsible Credit (CfRC) 
conference in London 2010 Reverend Jessie Jackson, a prominent US Community 
activist, had advocated that bank customers should buy a share in their bank to 
entitle them to attend its Annual General Meeting and make a noise by asking 
challenging questions. 
Whilst researching in Chicago for the ‘Small is Bankable’ Rowntree Report in 
1997, Andy had met Gale Cincotta, a community activist who had explained that 
the US Community Reinvestment Act was important not so much because it 
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required banks to lend into communities from which they took deposits, but 
because it required them to provide information by zip (postal) code on where 
they gathered their deposits and how much they re-invested in those 
communities. This information had empowered community activists such as Gale 
to lobby the banks. 
Ed Mayo spoke next and related three stories to illustrate the potentiality of 
community oriented mutual banking.  The first story, it so happens, involved Gale 
Cincotta and her role in identifying the ‘red lining’ by banks of neighbourhoods 
that was followed by branch closures leading because some communities had 
come to be regarded as ‘unbankable’, at least as regards bank lending.  The 
affected communities were often African-American ghettos and so the ‘red 
lining’, a term borrowed by the insurance industry, was tantamount to racism.  It 
prompted the US government to intervene, first through the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (1975) in response to the disproportionately high rate of decline 
by banks of applications for mortgages by Hispanics, and then the Community 
Reinvestment Act (1977), which was enhanced by the Clinton administration in 
1995. 
The CRA required banks to serve the credit needs of communities from which 
they took deposits – an ‘affirmative obligation’.  Compliance was encouraged in 
the late 1990s on banks sought to exploit opportunities provided by 
deregulation under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) to gain permission to 
diversify into investment banking.  CDFIs were adopted by the bigger banks on 
vehicles to facilitate the required re-investment and grew in importance as a 
result. 
In the chair, Andy noted that budding activists in the audience might consider 
joining the ‘Move your Money’ campaign in the UK, especially now that banks 
have been required to make it easy for customers to transfer their Standing 
Orders and Direct Debits, and thus their current accounts, to another bank. 
Andy also recalled the fictitious character George Bailey, played by James 
Stewart in the favourite US Christmas movie: “It’s a Wonderful Life” (1946).  
George Bailey ran the town’s Housing and Loan Association, which funded on 
affordable housing programme.  The town’s rival shareholder-owned bank 
unsuccessfully tried to undermine George and the Housing and Loan Association 
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in order to make way for commercial housing and other property development 
projects in the town.  
This raised the question: ‘what sort of banks do we really want’?  As Kate had 
remarked, diversity in bank ownership structures, including mutual and 
shareholder models, should perhaps be promoted as different models may serve 
different needs.  In the US and Germany, relatively small local mutual banks 
serve households and Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) needs, whilst larger, 
shareholder-owned banks serve larger companies and corporations. 
Ed’s second story related to the first Credit Union in England, which was set up 
within days of Ed’s birth in Wimbledon, well before the 1979 Credit Unions Act. 
It was established by people from the West Indies based on the CUs that had 
been formed in the British and Dutch Carribbean. The first was in Jamaica in 
1942, where a Boston-based, Irish-born Jesuit preist, Father John Sullivan, 
lead the project more than 15 years before the first credit union was started in 
Ireland; where they were introduced by women. CUs in the USA also have a 
much longer tradition than in England..  The largest CUs tend to be work-based, 
often benefiting from sponsorship providing back-office operations and 
premises as worker benefits. Smaller, more community based, CUs tend to have 
to rely on voluntary workers and use community meeting places to contain costs.  
The Right Reverend Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury, is promoting CUs 
as an alternative to high cost ‘payday’ lenders and making church premises 
available to help subsidise their operation.  In addition, the government, through 
the BIS has provided £30m to fund a CU development programme which the 
Unity Trust Bank is helping to disburse.  But, is too much is being expected by 
the CUs, and are they really suited, as mutual banks, to serving the subprime 
lending market? 
The Woodstock Institute in the Chicago has found that CUs tend to serve the 
blue collar workers and the lower middle classes, rather than focus on poverty 
alleviation as its director at the time, Malcom Bush, explained to Andy during 
his research for ‘Small and Bankable’.  With ‘payday’ lending rates now capped by 
the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK, an exodus from the payday lending 
business is underway.  Doorstep lenders, pawn brokers and other ‘loan sharks’ 
seem more likely to fill the void than CUs, Andy observed. 
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Ed’s third story recalled the origins of the UK Building Society movement.  
Richard Ketley, the landlord of the Golden Cross public house in Birmingham in 
1775 devised a mutual self-help scheme for home building for Irish ‘navies’ 
working on the building of Birmingham’s canals, which are more extensive, 
reputedly, than those of Venice!.  The Irish workers were largely homeless and 
so Richard Ketley, magnanimously encouraged them to put some of their money 
in a beer glass, rather than spend it all on beer.  When enough savings were 
accumulated, the first house was built, and they kept saving until all the 
contributors had a house and the building society was closed.  The idea spread 
and perpetual building societies developed.  The largest surviving one today, for 
those that demutualised to become mortgage banks all failed or were absorbed 
into larger banks in the financial crisis 2007-09, is Nationwide, a prominent 
member of Co-ops UK. 
Co-ops UK has around 6000 members; many of them in the financial sector, 
including CDFIs, and CUs, who are represented by ABCUL involving over 1 million 
members in Great Britain. Big banks however control the payments system and 
dominate retail banking service provision to households and SMEs, making it 
difficult for smaller ‘Challenger’ banks, including those set up by big retailers 
such as Tesco and Sainsbury’s, to penetrate the market in a significant way.  As 
a result, subsequent to the Festival of Learning, in July 2014, the UKs 
Competition and Markets Authority announced that it proposed to undertake a 
full review of retail banking product and service provision. Ed also drew 
attention to the City of London’s traditional focus on the international finance 
system, rather than financing UK regional development. 
Ed next drew lessons from the recent experience of the UK’s Cooperative Bank, 
which was not a mutual in the sense of being owned by its depositors and 
borrowers like a building society, but was owned by the Cooperative Group and 
had been allowed to overstretch itself by taking over the Britannia Building 
Society in date to form a ‘super-mutual’ and thus a potential challenger to the 
public shareholder-owned banks.  Britannia had been active in ‘buy to let’ 
mortgage lending, a non-core business that suffered from  rising bad loan levels  
following the collapse of the house price bubble in 2008/9. 
The Coop Group commissioned a report on 30th April 2014 by Sir Christopher 
Kelly (the ‘Kelly Review’) entitled: “Failings in Management and Governance - An 
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independent review of the Cooperative Bank”.  The £1.5bn capital shortfall 
discovered by the Bank of England was largely caused by the failure to conserve 
capital and instead to pursue the ill-advised purchase of Britannia Building 
Society as a result of failed oversight by the Banking Group Board of the bank’s 
executive.  Subsequently Lord Myers, who had chaired previously chaired a 
committee on corporate governance and served as ‘City minister’, was brought on 
to the Board to advise on improving its structure to facilitate better and more 
professional governance.  His recommendations in have largely been accepted, 
though in August 2014 the decision was taken by the new executive to include 
some direct member representation from the co-operative movement, which 
Lord Myers had counselled against.  The Cooperative Bank has now effectively 
been completely demutualised, with the Co-operative Group retaining a non-
controlling 8% share, and subsequent calls by the Bank of England for further 
increases in its capital seems likely to see the Group further reduce its 
shareholding. 
The building society demutualisation that followed the 1986 Building Societies 
Act involved ‘carpet baggers’ lodging deposits, and thus becoming shareholders, 
in targeted societies and then forcing a vote. The Nationwide staunched the 
process by adopting a structure that enabled a vote against de-mutualisation, 
although Kent Alliance was moving away from owner-control, and the 
International Cooperative Alliance was helping to instate structures that could 
block demutualisation. 
The way forward for new mutual banks, including CUs, may be to copy the 
German model under which cooperative and local authority backed savings banks 
(Sparkassen) share back office services provided by national and regional 
institutions that they own and engage in mutual self-regulation.  The Desjardins 
group in Canada provide another model of secondary co-operation and self-
regulation..   
The Basel Committee led post crisis increases in bank capital and liquidity 
requirements are designed to make highly leveraged shareholder-owned banks 
less likely to require taxpayer bail-outs in future These, and other new 
regulatory requirements have the potential to make public sector and mutual 
savings banks unviable, and thus to reduce diversity in banking, as the European 
and World Savings Bank Institutes are making clear. 
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Finally, Ed discussed innovations that might help mutualised local community 
banking to thrive.  Internet-based ‘crowd funding’ and ‘peer-to-peer’ lending 
offered the opportunity for funding local commercial and social enterprises and 
Co-ops UK with Locality is a pioneer in this field through its community-shares 
programme, including the microgenius platform..  In mainland Europe co-
operative or mutual guarantees are widely used by small businesses to support 
each other and attract bank lending, but this practice is yet to take root in the 
UK.  Other related models include group borrowing by the Confidi in Italy. Such 
schemes cover approximately 8% of SME funding in the rest of the EU. 
Promoting Access to finance for SMEs is the issue of the day in the UK and the 
EU. Simply urging banks to do more won’t work, but conditional cheap funding, 
such as the UK’s Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) and the ECB’s Targeted 
Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) scheme modelled on FLS, combined 
with appropriate government backed loan guarantee programmes, such as those 
provided by German development bank (KfW), may help, Andy observed. 
To survive and thrive, mutual and public savings banks will need to be regulated 
differently from the big shareholder-owned banks.  This is appropriate because 
savings banks have more stable retail deposit based funding, and thus little 
reliance on wholesale interbank funding, in contrast to the big commercial banks. 
They are net providers of wholesale deposits to larger banks, and engage 
primarily in collateralised lending, particularly as mortgage loan providers.  The 
new EU Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which comes into effect from 
November 2014 allows smaller local banks to be nationally regulated, initially at 
least, whilst the bigger cross border banks are to be supervised by the 
European Central Bank and regulated by the European Banking Authority. 
The third and final speaker was Professor Richard Werner, who asked at the 
outset whether we could in fact have good banks and what, indeed, was the 
purpose of banks?  He questioned the assertion that the ‘interest rate cycle’ 
drove the business cycle, for which there was no empirical evidence, indeed 
rather the reverse.  Instead, interest rates lag, or follow, economic fluctuations 
in the short run and thus fluctuations in growth drove fluctuations in interest 
rates, rather than the reverse.  This is because interest rates are the price of 
money, and rationing of the supply of money, which is overwhelmingly the result 
of commercial bank credit creation, rather than central bank money issuance, is 
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prevalent. It is the quantity of money created, relative to the demand, that 
determines its price.  The demand for money is relatively static, so it is the 
extent of rationing by banks in accordance with the ‘short-side price principle’, 
and thus the ‘economic rent’ extracted, that determines its price (interest 
rates).  The banks determine the supply of money and have been licensed to do 
so by governments through their monetary authorities.  Money is a ‘public good’, 
but its production has been privatised; allowing credit rationing, whilst avoiding 
usury rates for all except the ‘financially excluded’.  The more concentrated 
banking systems are allowed by governments to become, the greater the credit 
rationing and inequality in access to finance.   
The expansion of debt that results for money supply expansion can lead to a 
‘growth imperative’, where growth has to continue or even accelerate, 
regardless of environmental degradation, in order to facilitate the servicing of 
accumulating debt. To break this adverse spiral, lending by banks needs to be 
productive, rather than wastefully funding consumption and speculation, Richard 
argued. 
In the UK, 95% of retail banking is conducted by the big banks, whilst in  
Germany, 70% is conducted by local banks.  The newly created Hampshire 
Community Bank aims to be the first in a network of local banks serving the 
Southern region, with the proposed Bournemouth Bank hopefully joining it soon.  
The Hampshire Community Bank is a ‘not for profit’ entity owned by a charitable 
trust and is modelled on German Sparkassen banks. It is hoped it can initially 
tap into their back office network services until shared back office 
arrangements can be established, perhaps with the Bournemouth and other local 
community banks in the future. 
In the US and the EU, big banks tend to serve large firms whilst smaller banks 
serve smaller firms, including SMEs.  The UK faces a particular problem because 
‘The City’ tends to extract capital from the regions in order to finance 
developments in London or overseas. 
The Hampshire Community Bank has applied for a banking licence to enable it to 
leverage its £10m start-up capital into £200m worth of lending.  It will be a 
local bank for local people and local businesses and thus a true community 
oriented bank. 
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Andy recalled that he had written an Anglo-German Foundation Report with Dr. 
Eva Terberger (University of Heidelberg), entitled: “The British Banking 
System: A Good Role Model for Germany?’. It was published in2006, a year 
before the crisis.  At the time, the three (now two, following the absorption of 
the failing Dresdner Bank by Commerzbank during the Great (or ‘Global’) 
Financial Crisis, GFC) shareholder-owned banks in Germany were lobbying the 
German and EU authorities to be allowed to take over German savings banks in 
order to ‘rationalise’ the German banking system.  Their argument was that  
increased concentration in the bank industry would make it more cost efficient 
and better able to compete with the highly concentrated UK banking sector.  
We concluded that this would not be in the interests of households and SMEs, 
or indeed the German Mittelstand companies and the economy as a whole.  
Frankfurt’s goal of competing successfully with London as an international, or 
the European, financial centre was not worth sacrificing the retail savings bank 
sector that had served local communities so well, and indeed continued to do so, 
for. 
3. Questions and Answers Session 
In the Q&A session that followed the panel’s deliberations, the question of 
whether banks should lend for non-productive house purchases, as opposed to 
just for productive house-building, was posed. 
There was also discussion of the role of the investment banking culture 
inculcated by Bob Diamond as CEO of Barclays, a bank set up and run for many 
years by Quakers.  Would the new CEO, Anthony Jenkins, lead it back to its 
retail and commercial banks roots by scaling back its investment banking 
operations? 
It was commented that restoration of trust had both an ethical dimension and a 
need to re-assure on technical competence and that the GFC had been the 
result of inadequate risk management and the under-pricing of risks.  
It was noted that retail banking is not just about selling products, which 
through inappropriate bonus structures can lead to miss-selling, as in the PPI 
debacle, but also about banks serving customers, treating them fairly and 
‘relationship banking’.  In their report, Andy and Eva Terberger  had argued 
that local banking was successful because it was based on ‘relationship banking’, 
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rather than centralised computer-based lending techniques based on ‘credit 
scoring’. 
Ed pointed out that it is the composition of ownership that sets the principles.  
A Quaker family had given Barclays its sense of purpose, or mission.  The Co-
operative Bank had developed a set of ethical lending principles from 1992, and 
these have been retained in its mission by its new non-mutual owners. 
4. Concluding remarks by the Chair 
On 19 May, prior to this Festival of Learning panel event, the ‘Banking 
Standards Review: final report’ or ‘Lambert Review’ was published.  Sir Richard 
Lambert had been asked by the Chairman of the UK’s six biggest banks and 
Nationwide, its biggest building society, to design an independent organisation 
with the aim of promoting high standards in banking. 
The establishment of a Banking Standards Review Council (BSRC) was 
recommended.  It was hoped that the BSRC would “contribute to a continuous 
improvement in the behaviour and standards of banks and building societies 
doing business in the UK”.  The initiative was welcomed by the commissioning 
Chairmen and the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney. 
It was proposed that the BSRC be funded by, but remain independent from, the 
banks. If it succeeds in raising standards of behaviour and competence in the in 
the banking sector, and banks successfully improve their governance structures 
and internal risk controls, and also avoid further damaging scandals and 
consequent fines, then trust should progressively be restored.  
Banks and banking should become better at serving the public, or common, good, 
and thus local communities, as well as shareholders.  To do so, bonus structures 
will need to be appropriately aligned to assure customers are treated fairly, 
lending is undertaken responsibly, and access to appropriate and affordable 
financial services is assured.  Something akin to a ‘universal service obligation’, 
commonly employed for utilities, is required to avoid financial exclusion through 
credit rationing. 
A UK, or better EU, version of the US Community Reinvestment Act might be 
contemplated, but essentially the retail banking sector should be regulated as a 
utility given that the payments system is infrastructural and money (or credit) 
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is arguably a ‘public good’, and so is financial stability.  To the extent that 
regulation and supervision and economics of scale, and perhaps scope, require 
competition to be restricted and require bigness in banking, the case for 
regulating retail banking, like energy the energy sector, as a utility is even more 
compelling. The increasing adoption of internet and mobile phone based financial 
services is, however, challenging the alleged scale benefits form bigness in 
banking. 
References to be added, if appropriate. 
